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The Deviating Ship
By STEVEN F. FRIEDELL*
If a boat captain violated the itinerary to which it was committed,
and thereby brought about the loss of the boat, he shall measure
out to its owner as much as the boat ... ,and its hire ....
-Sumerian tablet, circa 1800 B.C.1
Whoever disregards the owner's stipulations is treated as a rob-
ber.-The Talmud
2
[M]erchant captains cannot deviate. .. .- Two Years Before the
Mast'
The law regarding deviation does not seem to me very clear.
-Learned Hand4
For over one hundred and fifty years, American and English
courts have held shipowners liable for cargo lost or damaged as a
result of an unjustified deviation from the agreed route.5 The
* Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers University at Camden. B.A., 1971, Brandeis Uni-
versity; J.D., 1974, University of Michigan. A grant from the Rutgers University Research
Council paid research expenses in connection with this Article. I am indebted to Professors
William Bishop, Jay Feinman, Roy Proffitt, and David Sharpe for their helpful comments.
1. J. PRITCHARD, ANcIENT NEAR EASTERN TEXTs RELATING TO THE OLD TESTAMENT 525
(3d ed. J. Finkelstein trans. 1969). The tablet is fragmentary and parts of the translation are
speculative.
2. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, BABA MEzIA 78a-78b, pt. 2, vol. 2, at 451 (I. Epstein ed. 1959).
3. R. DANA, TWO YEARS BEFORE THE MAST 226 (1840).
4. The Poznan, 276 F. 418, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
5. The earliest reported case that so held was Davis v. Garrett, 130 Eng. Rep. 1456
(C.P. 1830). An action based on deviation had been brought earlier in Max v. Roberts, 104
Eng. Rep. 36 (K.B. 1810), but was dismissed, partly because the plaintiff did not allege an
agreement to carry the goods directly to their destination. In Parker v. James, 171 Eng. Rep.
37 (K.B. 1814), a deviating ship had paid for the damaged cargo, but the cargo owners sued
for the insurance premiums they had paid on their policy. Recovery was denied. In Bond v.
The Cora, 3 F. Cas. 838 (C.C.D. Pa. 1807) (No. 1621), the court assumed that deviation
made a carrier liable. This was also the carrier's assumption. See Bond v. The Cora, 3 F.
Cas. 835, 837 (D. Pa. 1806) (No. 1620). See generally D. Sassoon & J. Cunningham, Unjus-
tifiable Deviation and the Hamburg Rules, in THE HAMBURG RULES ON THE CARRIAGE OF
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deviation doctrine is a powerful weapon for a litigant or court that
seeks to hold a shipowner liable notwithstanding the presence of
common law, contractual, or statutory defenses. Some courts have
gone further and used the deviation doctrine to impose strict lia-
bility on ships and other carriers for breaches other than depar-
tures from prescribed routes.' The expanded use of the doctrine, as
well as the doctrine itself, has been criticized as being "archaic,"
"penal," and of "doubtful justice."7 Two recently signed treaties
covering the carriage of goods by sea are indicative of the modern
trend; they substantially limit the effect of the deviation doctrine.8
The controversy over modern application of the deviation doc-
trine is illustrated by Philco Corp. v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc.9 In
Philco, the shipper and its insurers alleged that the airline's car-
riage of valuable computer equipment in a horizontal position, con-
trary to the shipper's directions, was an act of gross negligence or
recklessness. 10 The carrier's tariff and contract with the shipper os-
tensibly limited its liability to only 500 per pound, a rate grossly
GOODS BY SEA 167 (S. Manhabady ed. 1978); Morgan, Unreasonable Deviation Under
COGSA, 9 J. MAR. L. & COM. 481 (1978); Tetley & Cleven, Prosecuting the Voyage, 45 TUL.
L. REv. 807, 810-20 (1971); Deutsch, Deviation Under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 21
ORE. L. REV. 365 (1942); Note, Deviation in the Law of Shipping-the U.S., U.K. and Aus-
tralia, A Comparative Study, 11 J. INT'L. & ECON. 147 (1976); Comment, The Law of Mari-
time Deviation, 47 Tu.. L. REV. 155 (1972); Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d 145 (1954).
6. See, e.g., Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. SS Hong Kong Producer, 422 F.2d 7 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 964 (1970) (carriage of cargo on deck constitutes a devia-
tion in the absence of an agreement specifying that mode of carriage); Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Poseidon Schiffahrt (The Herman Schulte), 313 F.2d 872 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
819 (1963) (overcarriage and delay each constitute a deviation); Sidney Blumenthal & Co. v.
United States, 30 F.2d 247 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 847 (1929) (carriage by vessel
other than the one named is a deviation). See generally 2A BENDCT ON ADMuALTY § 123
(7th rev. ed. 1977). Even before these and similar breaches were labeled deviations, they
subjected carriers to liability. See, e.g., Trott v. Wood, 24 F. Cas. 218 (C.C.D. R.I. 1813) (No.
14,190); The Rebecca, 20 F. Cas. 373 (D. Me. 1831) (No. 11,619); Sleat v. Fagg, 106 Eng.
Rep. 1216 (K.B. 1822); Ellis v. Turner, 101 Eng. Rep. 1529 (K.B. 1800).
7. E.g., Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 691, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), a/I'd,
189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951); G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRLTY § 3-42, at 183
(2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as GmMORE & BLACK] ("It would seem unwise to extend
analogically and by way of metaphor a doctrine of doubtful justice under modern condi-
tions, of questionable status under [the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1031
(1970)] and of highly penal effect.").
8. See notes 96-112 & accompanying text infra.
9. 18 Mich. App. 206, 171 N.W.2d 16 (1969).
10. In fact, computer equipment was shipped on two flights, and the carrier violated
the shipper's instructions on both occasions. More extensive damage occurred on the second
.flight. Id. at 211, 171 N.W.2d at 18.
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inadequate to compensate for the damage suffered.11 The court
ruled that the tariff applied to liability for grossly negligent and
reckless conduct, but held that the carrier would be liable for the
entire loss if the trial court should find that the mistreatment of
cargo constituted a material and unjustifiable deviation.
Philco raises four issues concerning the deviation doctrine: (1)
its applicability to carriers other than ships; (2) its applicability to
fundamental breaches of contract other than geographic devia-
tions; (3) the liability of a deviating carrier for all losses when a
contract or statute expressly limits the carrier's liability to a lesser
gmount; and (4) its applicability when the cargo is insured. A fifth
issue not presented in Philco is the liability of a deviating carrier
for losses that would have occurred even if the carrier had not de-
viated.12 These issues are all interrelated, and they raise funda-
mental questions about the fairness of the deviation doctrine.
This Article first examines the history of the deviation doc-
trine and the different theories that have been used to justify its
application. The Article next analyzes whether and to what extent
courts should employ this doctrine. The Article concludes that de-
viating carriers should be held liable to deter carriers from creating
unauthorized risks, but that courts should allow deviating carriers
to limit their liability in accordance with certain contractual and
statutory provisions.
Deviation as a Basis for Liability
Prior to the 19th century, even nondeviating carriers were in-
surers of cargo and were liable for all cargo damage, except for
damage caused by acts of God or the public enemy with no negli-
gence on the carrier's part. 3 Deviation became an independent ba-
sis for liability only when carriers began inserting in bills of lading
provisions limiting their liability. Principles of freedom of contract
prevented courts from refusing to enforce these stipulations,14 but
11. Id. at 210-12, 171 N.W.2d at 18-19.
12. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 7, § 3-41, at 180-82.
13. The strict rule was based on the shippers' general inability to prove what caused
cargo damage and on a distrust of carriers, including the fear that carriers might conspire
with thieves to steal goods. Forward v. Pittard, 99 Eng. Rep. 953 (K.B. 1785). Later courts
also excused the carrier if the loss was caused by the fault of the shipper or by the inherent
vice of the goods. See Wirth v. The Arcadia Forest, 537 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1976); GILMoRE
& BLACK, supra note 7, § 3-22, at 139-40.
14. English courts even gave effect to public notices posted by the carrier that pur-
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various techniques, including the deviation doctrine, were used to
circumvent the contract provisions. For example, American courts
generally refused to allow exceptions from liability in cases of neg-
ligence.15 English courts were more favorable to carriers, but they
strictly construed stipulations, imposing liability in cases of gross
negligence,"8 misconduct,17 and misfeasance. 18 Although it was not
until 1830 that deviation was held to be a basis for liability, courts
and industry had assumed as much for some time.19
This Article considers four possible explanations for holding
deviating carriers liable. One of these is the wrongdoer princi-
ple-if the wrongdoer had done what it was supposed to do, the
damage might never have happened; because of this wrongful act,
the actor is strictly liable. A second, more refined principle is the
formalistic idea that the deviation substitutes a new voyage for the
one described in the contract, thereby rendering the bill of lading,
or at least all its exceptions, ineffective. A third rationale requires
the carrier to become an insurer because the deviation ousts the
shipper's insurance. Finally, one can maintain that the deviation
doctrine seeks to hold carriers liable for the unauthorized creation
of risk.
The Carrier as Wrongdoer
The wrongdoer principle is one of the most fundamental and
pervasive concepts underlying legal liability.20 Under this principle,
ported to limit liability. See Riley v. Home, 130 Eng. Rep. 1044 (C.P. 1828).
15. GILMoRE & BLACK, supra note 7, § 3-23 at 142.
16. Bodenham v. Bennett, 146 Eng. Rep. 384 (Ex. 1817).
17. Ellis v. Turner, 101 Eng. Rep. 1529 (K.B. 1800).
18. Sleat v. Fagg, 106 Eng. Rep. 1216 (K.B. 1822).
19. See note 5 supra. Even before the courts held deviation to override contractual
exceptions from liability, American and British courts imposed liability in cases in which
the carrier carried cargo beyond the destination or in which the carrier transported the
goods by a mode of carriage different from that agreed upon. See, e.g., Trott v. Wood, 24 F.
Cas. 218 (C.C.D. R.I. 1813) (No. 14,190); The Rebecca, 20 F. Cas. 373 (D. Me. 1831) (No.
11,619); Sleat v. Fagg, 106 Eng. Rep. 1216 (K.B. 1822); Ellis v. Turner, 101 Eng. Rep. 1529
(K.B. 1800).
20. This concept can be traced to Jewish law; see, e.g., BABYLONIAN TALMUD, BABA
MEZIA 36a, pt. 2, vol. 2, at 221 (I. Epstein ed. 1959); id., 48a, at 252; id. 78a-b, at 451, and to
Roman law; see, e.g., DIGEST 13.6.18, translated in 4 S. SCOTT, THE CwvIL LAw 185 (1932);
DIGEST 19.2.11-13.1, translated in 5 S. SCOTT, THE CiviL LAW 81 (1932); DIGEST 47.2.41,
translated in 10 S. ScoTT, Tim CIW LAW 260 (1932).
It also underlies many doctrines of our criminal law, see e.g., W. LAFAvw & A. SCOTT,
HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 545 (1972) ("At the early common law one whose conduct
brought about an unintended death in the commission or attempted commission of a felony
1538 [Vol. 32
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individuals are liable for damage that might not have happened
had they acted properly. Even though the wrongful act did not un-
reasonably increase the risk of the damage that occurred, the act,
once perceived as wrongful, makes the actor liable for all its conse-
quences. As a deviation is wrongful, the wrongdoer principle re-
quires that a deviating carrier be liable for losses that might not
have occurred had the carrier not deviated. 1
It is almost impossible for a deviating carrier to avoid liability
under cases subscribing to the wrongdoer principle. The shipper
does not have to show that the loss would not have occurred if the
carrier had not deviated, and the carrier cannot defend by showing
that the loss might have occurred had it not committed the wrong.
The only defense is that the same loss would necessarily have oc-
curred even if the carrier had not breached its duty.22 Not knowing
was guilty of murder."), and tort law, see e.g., W. PROSSER, HAND0ooK ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 32-33 (4th ed. 1971) ("If the defendant shoots or strikes at A, intending to wound or
kill him, and unforeseeably hits B instead, he is liable to B for an intentional tort.... [I]t
seems fairly clear that when the defendant intends any one of the five [torts of battery,
assault, false imprisonment, trespass to land or trespass to chattels], his intent will be
'transferred' to make him liable for any of the five, provided the harm is direct and immedi-
ate."); id. at 33 ("It is quite probable ... that the persistence of the principle [of trans-
ferred intent] has been due to a definite feeling that the defendant is at fault, and should
make good the damage. His act is characterized as 'wrongful,' and his fault is regarded as
absolute toward all the world, rather than relative to any one person. Having departed from
the social standard of conduct, he is liable for the harm which follows from his act, although
he did not intend it.").
The concept is also applied to persons handling other's property. See, 3 W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 1021, 1023 (rev. perm. ed. 1975) (di-
rector or other corporate officer); 2 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 170.25, at 1387 (3d ed.
1967) (trustees); RESTATEMFNT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 256, 227, Comment b, Illustration 4
(1965) (bailees and others).
21. See, e.g., The Indrapura, 171 F. 929, 937-38 (D. Or. 1909) ("[I]t seems to me more
consonant with justice that the carrier who contracts to carry by a particular route, but
notwithstanding proceeds to carry by another and totally different route, should stand re-
sponsible for any loss sustained to the cargo that would not have been sustained had it not
been for the deviation, whether the immediate cause of the loss was the act of God or some
cause excepted against in the contract itself. It does not seem right that the shipper should
lose in such an exigency. He is in no default, he is perfectly innocent of any breach of the
contract; while, on the other hand, had it not been for the wrongful carriage of his goods by
another route, no loss would have been sustained. Should the shipper lose, or the one who
committed the wrong? It seems but reasonable and just that the latter should sustain the
loss.").
22. See, e.g., The Delaware, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 579, 604 (1871) (carrier exempted from
liability for wrongful carriage on deck if "dangers were such as would have occasioned the
loss even if the goods had been stowed as required"); The Hermosa, 57 F.2d 20, 27 (9th Cir.
1932) ("[T]his liability [for delay], once incurred, can be avoided by the shipowner only by
an affirmative showing that the loss must have occurred, even without the deviation.") (em-
July 1981]
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what would have happened if the breach had not occurred, the
wrongdoer is made to bear the loss.
For all its appeal, however, the wrongdoer principle is subject
to criticism. Law should be based on reason, not emotion; liability
should not be unjustifiably imposed. It is unfair to hold a wrong-
doer liable for all damage that might be caused by the wrongdoing;
the penalty ought to be in proportion to the wrong. Therefore,
courts should not hold deviating ships liable for remote and un-
foreseeable losses. 23 Also, as parties can modify their rights by con-
tract, deviations should not result in liability if the parties' con-
tract permits the ship to deviate.
As the wrongdoer principle is based on emotional arguments,
it does not provide a reasoned explanation for the deviation doc-
trine.2 Unless there is some reasonable basis to support the devia-
phasis in original).
Similar rules are applied to other bailees, see Coggs v. Bernard, 92 Eng. Rep. 107, 111
(Q.B. 1703), and to trustees, see 2 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRusTS § 170.5, at 1304 (3d ed.
1967).
Admiralty law has developed the strict rule that if a ship violates a statutory naviga-
tional rule and causes a collision, the violation is presumed to be a cause of the collision, and
"the burden rests upon the ship of showing not merely that her fault might not have been
one of the causes, or that it probably was not, but that it could not have been." The Penn-
sylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125, 136 (1874).
An example from Roman law is contained in DIGEST 14.2.10.1, translated in 4 S. ScoTT,
THE CivL LAW 211-12 (1932) (if a master of a ship placed merchandise on a vessel inferior
to the one agreed on, the master is not liable provided both ships were lost on the voyage).
See generally J. STORY, COMMErARIS ON THE LAW OF BALENTs § 413c. (5th ed. 1851).
23. See Rodgers v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 75 Kan. 222, 88 P. 885 (1907). In Rodgers, goods
were destroyed by an unprecedented flood following a negligent delay by a railroad. "The
carrier's delay did not produce the flood, and for all the carrier could foresee promptitude
might have been as dangerous as delay." Id. at 231, 88 P. at 888. Liability would be punish-
ment "outrageously disproportionate to the fault," id., and would require a carrier "to regu-
late its conduct with reference to that which is utterly beyond mortal ken." Id. at 241, 88 P.
at 892.
24. Courts have applied the deviation principle to bailees and carriers inconsistently.
Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 256, Comment b, Illustration 1 (1965) (bor-
rower of automobile who deviates from agreed route is strictly liable for resulting loss to
automobile); Henry v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 83 Kan. 104, 113 P. 1005 (1910) (carrier that
mistakenly fails to deliver goods after arrival at destination is strictly liable for subsequent
losses); Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Poseidon Schiffahrt (The Herman Schulte), 313 F.2d 872
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 819 (1963) (delay by ship constitutes a deviation making
ship liable for loss) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 451, Comment a, at 486 (1965)
(carrier which negligently delays the transportation of goods is not responsible for loss
caused by unforeseen causes). It is difficult to reconcile the deviation cases with the Restate-
ment's position on delay. For 150 years, deviations have been considered wrong because
they cause delay. Compare Davis v. Garrett, 130 Eng. Rep. 1456, 1458 (C.P. 1830) (shipper's
argument) with Sweeney, The Uncitral Draft Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea, 7 J.
[Vol. 32
tion doctrine, courts ought to exempt deviating carriers from
liability.
The Contract Approach
One of the oldest and most popular explanations for the devia-
tion doctrine emphasizes the contractual nature of the bill of lad-
ing. Because the parties have contracted only for the voyage de-
scribed in the bill of lading, the bill of lading does not apply to a
new voyage created by a deviation.25 Consequently, a deviating
ship cannot rely on the bill of lading's exemptions from liability
and becomes an "insurer" of the cargo's safety.2 6 This theory ap-
pears more rational than the wrongdoer approach. Instead of being
imposed in retribution for wrongdoing, the carrier's liability ap-
pears to flow naturally from the deviation.
Nonetheless, the contract theory is unsatisfactory in several
respects. First, the theory could be applied to deprive the carrier of
the bill of lading's protection for the entire voyage, including pro-
tection for loss occurring before the deviation. Such a result would
be highly punitive-even the wrongdoer principle would not lead
to such a result27-- and few have seriously advocated imposing such
MAR. L. & COMM. 327, 346 (1976). (Norway's view of deviation). If so, it makes no sense to
hold deviating carriers liable while exonerating carriers that stay on their routes but delay
arrival.
25. E.g., Pacific Coast Co. v. Yukon Independent Transp. Co., 155 F. 29, 36 (9th Cir.
1907); Jones v. The Flying Clipper, 116 F. Supp. 386, 387-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Hain S.S. Co.
v. Tate & Lyle, Ltd., [1936] 2 All E.R. 597, 608 (H.L.) (Lord Wright); Joseph Thorley, Ltd.
v. Orchis S.S. Co., [1907] 1 K.B. 660, 669 (C.A.) (Cozens-Hardy, L.J.); Balian & Sons v. Joly,
Victoria, & Co., 6 T.L.R. 345 (C.A. 1890) (Lord Esher, M.R., and Fry, L.J.). The principle
was first stated by Lord Mansfield in a case involving an insurance policy: "The true objec-
tion to a deviation is not the increase of the risk. If that were so, it would only be necessary
to give an additional premium. It is, that the party contracting has voluntarily substituted
another voyage for that which has been insured." Lavabre v. Wilson, 99 Eng. Rep. 185, 189
(K.B. 1779).
26. See, e.g., St. Johns N.F. Shipping Corp. v. S.A. Companhia Gera, 263 U.S. 119,
124 (1923); Jones v. The Flying Clipper, 116 F. Supp. 386, 387-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Mc-
Kahan v. American Express Co., 209 Mass. 270, 95 N.E. 785 (1911). See generally GmMoRs
& BLACK, supra note 7, § 3-40, at 176-77. One view holds that the deviation constitutes such
a fundamental breach of the contract that the shipper may be permitted to rescind; though
of course the plaintiff wants damages, not rescission. See Philco Corp. v. Flying Tiger Line,
Inc., 18 Mich. App. 206, 171 N.W.2d 16 (1969).
27. Under the wrongdoer principle, a deviating carrier is not liable when it can prove
that the loss would have happened even if it had not deviated. See text accompanying note
22 supra. The carrrier can meet that burden with respect to losses occurring before the
deviation.
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liability.2" Second, the contract theory would require that a deviat-
ing carrier, having lost its protection under the bill of lading, be
returned to its common law status,29 in which it would be exempt
from liability for losses caused by acts of God or the public en-
emy.30 Courts, however, generally have not adhered to that limita-
tion; deviating carriers are liable even though the immediate cause
of the loss is an act of God or a public enemy.31
A literal application of the contract approach raises further
difficulties. If the entire contract is voided, the shipper has no ba-
sis on which to establish its rights against the carrier. The bill of
lading is essential to the shipper's claim, even for one based on
conversion, 2 for without the bill of lading the shipper cannot show
that it retained any rights to the goods. Some courts therefore re-
fine the contract theory to hold that, although the contract re-
mains in force, the exceptions are intended to apply only to the
contracted voyage, and not to a substituted voyage. 3 Although this
theory describes the result reached, 4 it does not explain why a
28. The only case found in which the court indicated that a deviation would render a
carrier liable for losses occurring prior to the deviation is Internationale Guano en
Superphosphaatwerken v. Robert Macandrew & Co., [1909] 2 K.B. 360. As deviation made
the bill of lading's liability exceptions inapplicable, the court applied common law liability
principles. A common law exemption for losses caused by the inherent vice of cargo applied;
the ship was held liable only for the postdeviation losses.
29. See Farr v. Hain S.S. Co., 121 F.2d 940, 944 (2d Cir. 1941); Davis Bros. v. Blue
Ridge Ry., 81 S.C. 466, 62 S.E. 856 (1908).
30. See note 13 & accompanying text supra.
31. Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Dampkiesaktieselskabet Balto, 282 F. 235 (2d Cir. 1922)
(ship liable for losses caused by public enemy); The Indrapura, 171 F. 929, 936-38 (D. Or.
1909), quoted in note 21 supra; Benoit v. Central Vermont Ry., 116 Vt. 266, 73 A.2d 321
(1950) (railway held liable for losses caused by act of God); James Morrison & Co. v. Shaw,
Savill & Albion Co., [1916] 2 K.B. 783 (C.A.). This higher standard was presumed by the
parties in Parker v. James, 171 Eng. Rep. 37 (K.B. 1814). But see Internationale Guano en
Superphosphaatwerken v. Robert Macandrew & Co., [1909] 2 K.B. 360 (deviating carrier
can rely on common law defense of inherent vice of goods for predeviation losses). Also, the
contract theory does not explain why railroads that breach their contracts by delaying do
not lose the benefit of their contractual exceptions. See note 24 supra.
32. There is some doubt whether a shipper can maintain an action for conversion
against a deviating ship. See cases collected 33 A.L.R.2d 154, 212 n.20. Compare The Citta
Di Messina, 169 F. 472 (S.D.N.Y. 1909) (Hough, J.) (shipper has "a right ... to rescind the
contract of shipment and treat the goods as converted") with The Cabo Villano, 18 F.2d 220
(2d Cir. 1927) (Hough, J.) ("To denounce the carrier's act or omission [wrongful delivery of
goods] as a conversion is probably accurate in terms of common law, but in the admiralty is
only calling bad names").
33. See, e.g., Gibaud v. Great Eastern Ry., [1921] 2 K.B. 426, 435 (C.A.).
34. See, e.g., Drake v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 125 Tenn. 627, 148 S.W. 214 (1911).
Cf. Barrett v. Freed, 35 A.2d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1944) (warehouseman who moved goods across
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deviation is such a fundamental breach that it deprives a carrier of
the protection for which it contracted.35
The Insurance Factor
In the early 19th century, deviations deprived cargo owners of
their insurance. This loss of protection justified holding the ship-
owner liable for any resulting loss that the insurance would no
longer cover." The insurance theory destroys the carrier's argu-
ments that it should not be liable for unforeseeable losses of cargo
occurring after a deviation. Even if the destruction of cargo were
not a likely result of the deviation, the loss of cargo insurance
would be clearly foreseeable; it was common knowledge that devia-
tion would oust the insurance on the ship and cargo.
37
The insurance theory seems to impose broader liability than
does the wrongdoer principle. The wrongdoer principle suggests
that a deviating ship should be exonerated for losses that are not
caused by the deviation. In contrast, the insurance theory holds
deviating ships liable for all loss occurring after the deviation, even
if the same loss would have occurred without the deviation.38 This
stricter rule arises from the cargo owner's loss of insurance at the
moment the ship deviates, without any opportunity to restore the
risk protection. The difference between the two theories, however,
is essentially academic. As long as a deviating carrier, to escape
liability under the wrongdoer principle, must meet the difficult
burden of showing that the loss would have occurred without the
alley to other warehouse where they were destroyed by fire lost benefit of exemptions and
limitations in contract).
35. "[A] deviation goes to the essence of the venture, and it is clear enough why it
should be so treated in extreme cases, though it is not entirely apparent why it should al-
ways be." Farr v. Hain S.S. Co., 121 F.2d 940, 944 (2d Cir. 1941) (L. Hand, J.).
36. Professor Theophilus Parsons was apparently the first to state that the liability for
deviation was required because the shipper lost its insurance by a deviation: "[Ilf the vessel
deviates, and the cargo is insured, the risk terminates, and the underwriters are exonerated.
It follows, as a necessary consequence, that the shipowner having put an end to the contract
existing between the freighter and the underwriter, should stand in the place of the latter,
and assume his risk." 1 T. PARSONs, A TREATISE ON MARITIME LAw 122 n.4 (1859). Professor
Parson's reasoning was echoed more recently in Accinanto, Ltd. v. Cosmopolitan Shipping
Co. (The Ocean Liberty), 99 F. Supp. 261, 269 (D. Md. 1951), aff'd in part, rev'd in part
and remanded sub nom. A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi v. Accinanto, Ltd., 199 F.2d 134
(4th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 992 (1953).
37. See Hain S.S. Co. v. Tate & Lyle, Ltd., [1936] 2 All E.R. 597, 601 (H.L.) (Lord
Atkin).
38. See Hudson v. Columbian Transfer Co., 137 Mich. 255, 100 N.W. 402 (1904)
(warehouse).
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deviation, 39 the result under either theory will almost always be
the same.40
The insurance theory appears to explain not only the geo-
graphic deviation cases, but also the imposition of strict liability
for wrongfully carrying cargo on deck, overcarriage, or sending
cargo by a different carrier.4' In another context, the theory has
been used to justify holding warehouse owners liable when they
store property at a place other than the one specified in the con-
tract. In the warehouse cases, the plaintiffs lost their insurance be-
cause their policies specified that the goods would be stored at the
agreed upon location.42
39. See notes 22-23 & accompanying text supra.
40. There have been only a few situations in which courts have concluded that a loss
following a deviation clearly was not caused by the deviation, but upon closer examination
one cannot say that the burden of proof was met by the deviating carrier. In Thorley v.
Orchis S.S. Co., [1907] 1 K.B. 660 (C.A.), the carrier deviated and arrived late at its destina-
tion. Longshoremen were negligent in the unloading of cargo and some of it was damaged. A
similar fact pattern occurred in The Ida, 75 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1935). Although both courts
concluded that there was no causal connection between the deviation and the loss, it is
impossible to show that the same loss must have occurred had there been no deviation. Had
the ships not deviated, they would have arrived on a different day. Different longshoremen
may have been involved, or, if the same longshoremen were involved, they may have been
more careful on that occasion. See World Wide S.S. Co. v. India Supply Mission, 316 F.
Supp. 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (stranding in Suez Canal might not have occurred if ship had
arrived earlier; carrier might have hired better pilot; ship might have encountered better
weather).
A more difficult fact pattern to unravel is that in which goods are wrongfully stowed on
deck and are subsequently lost by fire or explosion. See A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi v.
Accinanto, Ltd., 199 F.2d 145 (4th Cir. 1952). In these cases, the carrier must prove that the
goods would have been destroyed even if they had not been stowed on deck. In most cases
the carrier will be unable to meet this burden. Generally, goods are wrongfully carried on
deck because of overbooking. Thus, if the carrier had not carried the goods on deck, it is
possible that the carrier would not have carried the goods at all.
41. The St. Johns N.F., 280 F. 553, 556-57 (2d Cir. 1922), aff'd sub nom. St. Johns
N.F. Shipping Corp. v. S.A. Companhia Geral, 263 U.S. 119 (1923) ("When the carrier vol-
untarily varies from the method or place of carriage contracted for, he leaves the shipper
with unknown risks against which he has not insured and he cannot recover on the insur-
ance which he obtains."); The Sarnia, 278 F. 459, 462 (2d Cir. 1921), cert. denied, 258 U.S.
625 (1922) ("[The shipowner] commits a gross violation of his contract. He thereby not only
renders void the shipper's marine insurance, but he exposes the goods to a much greater
peril of the sea."); Calderon v. Atlas S.S. Co., 64 F. 874, 878-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1894), aff'd, 69 F.
574 (2d Cir. 1895), rev'd on other grounds, 170 U.S. 272 (1898) (overcarriage or sending
goods on another vessel makes carrier liable as an insurer because it violates the contract
and avoids the shipper's insurance).
42. Barrett v. Freed, 35 A.2d 180, 182 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Hudson v. Columbian Transfer
Co., 137 Mich. 255, 100 N.W. 402 (1904); Lilley v. Doubleday, 7 Q.B.D. 510 (1881). However,
the insurance theory does not explain why railroads that delay are not liable for loss caused
by an unforeseen event. See note 24 supra. Unreasonable delay can also deprive a shipper of
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The insurance theory now seems far removed from the emo-
tion of the wrongdoer approach and from the formalism of the con-
tract theory. The theory was based on business practice and, un-
like the wrongdoer and contract approaches, it explained why a
deviation was so wrong that it deprived the carrier of the con-
tracted exceptions to liability. The insurance approach provided an
objective measure of the wrong: deviation resulted in the loss of
the cargo owner's insurance coverage.
The difficulty with the insurance theory is that it does not
provide a principled basis for continuing the deviation rule.4 3 Mod-
ern cargo insurance policies typically provide that cargo will re-
main insured in case of a deviation upon payment of a premium."
Holding a deviating carrier liable even when the cargo remains or
could have remained insured applies a rule long after the reason
for the rule has disappeared.
Proponents of the insurance theory have not suggested that,
given the provisions of modern cargo insurance, courts be required
to exonerate deviating carriers. Some have stated that deviation
makes a carrier liable even if the insurance policy covered devia-
tion. 5 Other proponents of the insurance theory suggest that a de-
its insurance. See 1 R. HUTCHINSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CARRIERS § 307 (3d ed.
1906). Similarly, the insurance theory does not explain why bailees that misuse owner's
property are liable for any resulting loss. See note 24 supra. The owner does not necessarily
lose its insurance because of the bailee's unpermitted use.
43. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 7, § 3-40, at 177, § 3-41, at 181-82.
44. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 7, § 3-41, at 182.
45. See Hain S.S. Co. v. Tate & Lyle, Ltd., [19361 2 All E.R. 597, 601 (H.L.) (Lord
Atkin). Cf. The St. Johns N.F., 280 F. 553 (2d Cir. 1922), aff'd sub nom. St. Johns N.F.
Shipping Corp. v. S.A. Companhia Geral, 263 U.S. 119 (1923) (deviating ship liable for full
value of goods even though the goods were underinsured); Parker v. James, 171 Eng. Rep.
37 (K.B. 1814) (carrier voluntarily paid shipper full value of goods even though the goods
were underinsured). Other courts, not necessarily endorsing the insurance theory, have held
or indicated that a shipper is not barred from recovering even though insurance has not
been lost. See, e.g., United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Rosenberg Bros. &
Co., 12 F.2d 721, 723 (9th Cir. 1926), aff'g 7 F.2d 893 (N.D. Cal. 1925), rev'd on other
grounds, 276 U.S. 202 (1928); The Citta Di Messina, 169 F. 472, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1909); Crosby
v. Fitch, 12 Conn. 410, 423 (1838). Cf. Bond v. The Cora, 3 F. Cas. 838 (C.C.D. Pa. 1807)
(No. 1621) (deviating ship is liable whether shipper is insured or not); The Pelotas, 43 F.2d
571 (E.D. La. 1930), aff'd, 66 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1933) (cargo insurer paid part of loss; carrier
liable for deviation); Hand v. Baynes, 4 Whart. 204, 212 (Pa. 1839) (shipper was uninsured;
carrier liable for deviation).
If the insurance policy covers deviation, the cargo owner's insurer can sue for damages
based on the deviation under principles of subrogation. See Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Posei-
don Schiffahrt (The Herman Schulte), 313 F.2d 872 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 819
(1963).
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viating ship be held liable for cargo lost as a consequence of a
deviation only if the cargo owner actually lost its insurance. This
approach allows shippers to determine the scope of the carrier's
liability through their choice of insurance coverage.46 If the law of
deviation can be justified only by the insurance theory, it is unsat-
isfactory to allow shippers to sue for damages resulting from devia-
tion if they forego an opportunity to insure against the risk in-
volved.47 Another rationale must be found if the deviation doctrine
is to be justified.
The Risk Approach
The three approaches discussed thus far each fail to justify
holding deviating ships liable for goods damaged on account of a
deviation. A better approach to the deviation doctrine would be
based on the idea that deviations are wrongful because they in-
crease the risk of loss beyond that permitted by contract.48 Courts
hold deviating ships liable to deter them from creating unautho-
rized risks. The risk approach is similar in some respects to each of
the three previous approaches. Like the wrongdoer principle, this
approach treats the deviating carrier as a wrongdoer. It emphasizes
that the carrier breached its contract, as does the contract theory.
In addition, the risk approach emphasizes the creation of risks not
contemplated by the parties, similar to the insurance theory. Al-
though the risk approach does not justify all applications of the
law of deviation, it provides an analysis superior to the other
46. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 7, § 3-41, at 182.
47. See also The Velma Lykes, 6 F. Supp. 886, 893 (S.D. Tex. 1934) (shipper's insur-
ance did not cover goods as stowed on vessel). "No liability can arise by reason of libellant
relying upon a policy of insurance so limited in its scope and about which respondents knew
nothing." Id.
48. A commonly quoted expression of the risk theory is: "As applied in admiralty law,
the term 'deviation' was originally and generally employed to express the wandering or
straying of a vessel from the customary course of the voyage, but in the course of time it has
come to mean any variation in the conduct of a ship in the carriage of goods whereby the
risk incident to the shipment will be increased, such as carrying the cargo on the deck of the
ship contrary to custom and without the consent of the shipper, delay in carrying the goods,
failure to deliver the goods at the port named in the bill of lading and carrying them farther
to another port, or bringing them back to the port of original shipment and reshipping
them. Such conduct has been held to be a departure from the course of agreed transit and
to constitute a 'deviation' whereby the goods have been subjected to greater risks, and, when
lost or damaged in consequence thereof, clauses of exceptions in bills of lading limiting lia-
bility cease to apply." G. W. Sheldon & Co. v. Hamburg Amerikanische Packet-Actien-Ge-
sellsehaft, 28 F.2d 249, 251 (3d Cir. 1928).
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theories.
To analyze the deviation problem using the risk approach, it is
helpful to discuss separately the role of deviation in invalidating
the different types of exceptions and limitations to the carrier's lia-
bility: exceptions under the common law, exceptions under con-
tract, limitations under valuation clauses, and limitations imposed
by statute.
The Common Law Defenses: Acts of God and King's Enemies
At common law, a carrier was strictly liable for any loss or
damage to cargo unless it was caused by an act of God or by a
public enemy.49 The carrier was therefore exempt only when it
could prove that the goods were destroyed by an unforeseeable
event outside its control. But even these limited exceptions did not
apply if the carrier's negligence contributed to the cargo loss. A
deviation, like a negligent act that contributes to the loss, usually
increases the risk of loss by an act of God or by the public enemy.50
The added risk arising from deviation may not constitute negli-
gence, but the extra risk should be attributed to the carrier be-
cause it has provided service inferior to that bargained for.
Theoretically, every carrier, including a deviating ship that
provides service inferior to that contracted for, should refund part
of the freight to compensate the shipper for the increased risk.5'
Problems of practicality and judicial economy prevent calculating
and collecting the amount of the extra risk created by each devia-
tion or negligent carriage of cargo. The amount of the refund in
each case would probably be relatively small. Moreover, because a
carrier's deviation or negligence is often only discovered by the
shipper when damage occurs, making the carrier pay for that dam-
age is a more practical way to compensate a cargo owner for the
unauthorized risks to which the cargo has been exposed.
49. See note 13 & accompanying text supra.
50. For example, the chance of cargo being damaged by an unforeseeable hurricane is
increased if a carrier prolongs its voyage by deviating or by negligently stowing the cargo.
See Smith v. United States Shipping Emergency Fleet Corp., 2 F.2d 390, 390 (S.D.N.Y.
1924), modified, 26 F.2d 337 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 628 (1928) (risk increased by
extended route "simply because the risk would be prolonged"). See also L. GRsEN, RATIO-
NALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 29 (1927); Bauer, Common Carrier's Negligent Delay Plus Act of
God, 8 NOTRE DAME LAW. 394 (1933).
51. Professors Gilmore and Black have suggested that a deviating ship ought to pay
cargo owners for the premiums they pay to cover cargo in case of deviation. GILMORE &
BLACK, supra note 7, § 3-41, at 182 n.124.
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The deviating carrier who has committed no other deviation or
act of negligence, however, bears a heavy burden of liability. This
situation provides a windfall to the shipper who has only suffered
cargo damage on one occasion. Nevertheless, the burdens and ben-
efits should average out over time. The deviating or negligent car-
rier that damages cargo and pays damages in effect pays for its
other deviations or negligent acts that did not cause physical dam-
age but that did constitute inferior service. Similarly, the shipper
who recovers damages for cargo injured by a deviation or negligent
act in effect recovers for the breaches of contract that occurred
when its goods were carried by carriers on other occasions.5 1
The risk theory contains a punitive aspect. A deviation might
increase the risk of loss through an act of God, but does not create
that risk. Although the carrier may not be able to prove that the
loss would have occurred without the deviation, in its absence
there would remain some risk that loss might result from an act of
God. Yet a deviating ship is liable for all loss caused by an act of
God subsequent to the deviation. Fairness requires that the deviat-
ing ship be liable only for the portion of the loss attributable to the
increased risk that its deviation created. The difficulty of calculat-
ing the actual amount by which a deviation increases the risk of
loss often makes the punitive aspect of deviation unavoidable. It is
unduly harsh, however, to hold a carrier liable if its deviation does
not increase the risk of the type of loss that occurs.53
52. A similar rationale explains the generally accepted rule that a bailee is liable for
damage to a chattel that is being used in an unpermitted fashion. See note 24 supra. Ordi-
narily, such a bailee subjects the chattel to greater risks than those bargained for, and ordi-
narily the bailee's breach will be detected only when damage occurs. Making the bailee pay
for that damage in effect makes it pay for the unauthorized use of the property. The rule
may appear harsh as applied to an individual bailee who misuses property on only one occa-
sion and has to pay the entire value of the property as the "rental" price for the unautho-
rized use, but it is the only practical way of deterring bailees in general from making unau-
thorized use of bailed property. The risk theory does not explain why delaying railroads are
not held liable for losses caused by a delay, which also increases the risk of loss beyond that
authorized by contract. As with ships, practical considerations prevent holding railroads lia-
ble for a portion of the freight for each delay. But holding railroads liable for losses result-
ing from the increased risk would help prevent delays.
53. For example, even though a deviation does not increase the risk of loss or injury
during unloading, deviating carriers have been held liable for these losses. See The Ida, 75
F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1935); Thorley v. Orchis S.S. Co. [1907] 1 K.B. 660 (C.A.). But see notes




If a deviation is deemed harmful because it increases the risk
beyond that permitted by the contract, the parties should be able
to exempt the carrier by contract from liability for the deviation.
Carriers have used two types of exemption clauses: the deviation
clause and the general list of exceptions. A deviation clause pro-
vides that the carrier can deviate from the intended or expected
itinerary." For example, it might provide that the carrier can pro-
ceed to any port in any order even if outside the customary route.
The general list of exceptions supplements the common law excep-
tions of act of God and public enemy with a list of causes or types
of injury from which the carrier seeks to be exonerated, such as
rust, decay, fire, or vermin.
Courts generally have refused to apply the deviation or excep-
tions clauses to exonerate a deviating carrier. Deviation clauses
have been narrowly construed to permit only reasonable devia-
tions,55 while the exceptions are limited to the voyage for which
the parties contracted.5 6 A parallel exists between deviation cases
and the treatment of carrier negligence. Carriers often sought to
escape liability for negligence by invoking contractual provisions
permitting negligence. Most American courts refused to enforce
these clauses excusing negligence on grounds of public policy.57
Underlying the refusal to excuse deviation and negligence was the
general belief that an unequal bargaining relationship existed be-
tween carriers and shippers. Bills of lading were perceived as adhe-
sion contracts drafted by the carrier, affording the shipper "no real
freedom of choice."5'
54. See, e.g., Hellenic Lines v. United States, 512 F.2d 1196, 1206 (2d Cir. 1975); The
Emilia S. de Perez, 287 F. 361, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1922), aff'd mem., 288 F. 1019 (2d Cir. 1923)
(bill of lading provided that the carrier had liberty "to proceed to the port stated in this bill
of lading via any port or place en route or beyond, in any order, whether in or out of the
customary or advertised route for any purposes whatever"); GILMORE & BLACK, supra note
7, § 3-40 at 177-78.
55. See, e.g., Hellenic Lines v. United States, 512 F.2d 1196 (2d Cir. 1975); The
Blandon, 287 F. 722, 725-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1922). See generally GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 7,
§ 3-40, at 178.
56. See notes 25-26, 32 & accompanying text supra.
57. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 7, § 3-23, at 142; W. PORTER, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF BILLS OF LADING, § 103-41 (1891). Although English courts enforced these
clauses, they were sometimes construed narrowly. 5 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 400, at
199 (4th ed. 1974). See notes 16-18 & accompanying text supra.
58. Liverpool & Great W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397, 441 (1889).
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Although it is inaccurate to assume that all shippers lack the
ability to bargain effectively with carriers, 9 courts, in resolving dis-
putes between carriers and large shippers, regularly apply devia-
tion rules developed to aid the small shipper.6 0 This treatment may
be justified by the difficulty of determining when bargaining posi-
tions are equal or by the desirability of having one set of rules ap-
plicable to all. Yet it is somewhat unfair for courts to refuse to
enforce contracts between parties of equal bargaining power.61 This
unfairness can be diminished through enforcement of valuation
clauses and statutory provisions that limit a carrier's liability.
Valuation Clauses
Prior to the adoption of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
(COGSA) in 1936,62 carriers commonly inserted valuation clauses
in their bills of lading, stipulating the value of the goods-typically
$100 per package.6 3 Although these clauses had the effect of limit-
ing the carriers' liability even in cases of negligence, courts gener-
ally enforced them, out of a sense of fairness to the carriers."
Shippers had the opportunity to declare a higher valuation if they
paid a higher freight. To disregard the agreed valuation in case of
negligent loss would be to give the shipper a benefit for which it
had elected not to pay. Arguably, the carrier would have exercised
greater care had it been aware of its potentially higher liability.65
Some distinguished judges maintained that courts enforcing
valuation clauses in cases of negligence should do so also in cases
of deviation, especially because most deviations do not increase the
59. For example, in Philco Corp. v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 18 Mich. App. 206, 171
N.W.2d 16 (1969), it would have been difficult to maintain that Philco was an unsophistica-
ted shipper dealing'at an unfair disadvantage with carriers. See text accompanying note 9
supra.
60. See, e.g., Encyclopaedia Britannica v. SS Hong Kong Producer, 422 F.2d 7 (2d Cir.
1970), rev'g 297 F. Supp. 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 964 (1970).
61. See Photo Production Ltd. v. Securicor Transport Ltd., [1980] 1 All E.R. 556, 561
(H.L.) (Lord Wilberforce). Lord Wilberforce suggested, however, that the deviation cases
are "sui generis with special rules derived from historical and commercial reasons." Id.
62. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1976).
63. See H.R. REP. No. 2218, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1936); 2 Report of the Thirtieth
Conference, 30 Aug.-3 Sept. 1921, International Law Association 161 (1922) (remarks of Sir
Norman Hill).
64. The leading case in the federal courts was Hart v. Pennsylvania R.R., 112 U.S. 331
(1884).
65. Liverpool & Great W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397, 442 (1889); Hart
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 112 U.S. 331, 337 (1884).
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risk of loss to an unreasonable degree.66 By 1923, however, the pre-
66. The Sarnia, 278 F. 459, 466 (2d Cir. 1921), cert. denied, 258 U.S. 625 (1922)
(Mack, J., dissenting); Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Dampkiesaktieselskabet Balto (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 9, 1921) (A. Hand, J.) reprinted in Record, at 158-67, 282 F. 235; De Vasconcellos v.
The Sarnia, No. 60-374 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 1919) (Hough, J.), reprinted in Record, at 146-
48, 258 U.S. 625. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Hinely-Stephens Co., 64 Fla. 175, 60 So.
749 (1913) (three judges decided that deviation ousted valuation clause; two judges dis-
sented.); J.J. Douglas Co. v. Minnesota Transfer Ry., 62 Minn. 288, 64 N.W. 899 (1895). Cf.
Foster v. Great Western Ry., [1904] 2 K.B. 306 (in consideration of reduced rate, shipper
exempted carrier from liability for delay; held, exemption applies to overcarriage). In Calde-
ron v. Atlas S.S. Co., 170 U.S. 272 (1898), the ship overcarried goods, which were lost. The
primary issue addressed was the validity of a stipulation in the contract that exempted the
carrier from all liability for goods worth more than $100 per package. Id. at 276. The district
court, 64 F. 874 (S.D.N.Y. 1894), and the court of appeals, 69 F. 574 (2d Cir. 1895), with one
dissent, upheld the stipulation, but the Supreme Court reversed. 170 U.S. at 282. Although
none of the courts directly addressed the issue of whether an overcarriage or deviation
would oust a valid valuation clause, the issue was raised in the briefs before the Second
Circuit and the Supreme Court. Libellant's Brief on Appeal at 9, Brief for Appellee at 7-10,
69 F. 574 (2d Cir. 1895); Brief for Appellant at 13, Brief for Appellee at 45-49, 170 U.S. 272
(1898). There is some indication that the lower court judges believed that a valuation clause
survived a deviation. In the initial decision, relying in part on Ellis v. Turner, 101 Eng. Rep.
1529 (K.B. 1800), District Judge Addison Brown ruled that the overcarriage constituted a
very serious deviation because it broke the contract and deprived the shipper of his insur-
ance. See 64 F. at 878. But Ellis also held that an overcarriage ousts a valuation clause in
the carrier's public notice. See note 14 supra. Judge Brown did not follow that part of the
decision.
Judge Wallace, dissenting in the court of appeals, argued that the stipulation was not a
valid valuation clause. He stated, however, that a proper valuation clause "would necessa-
rily, in the absence of fraud, conclude both the shipper and the carrier upon any inquiry as
to the amount of damages arising from a loss, and the contract would therefore extend to
any kind of a liability-the liability of the carrier as an insurer as well as for a negligent
loss." 69 F. at 578 (Wallace, J., dissenting). Several years later, the Second Circuit said that
Calderon did not prevent a determination that deviation ousts the valuation clause. The
Sarnia, 278 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1921), cert. denied, 258 U.S. 625 (1922).
As Judge Wallace's dissent implies, merely denominating a deviating ship an "insurer"
does not require ousting the valuation clause. This view was most directly stated by the
eminent admiralty authority, Judge Hough, who wrote: "If [the ship owner becomes an in-
surer], he becomes insurer of something that the parties of the insurance had agreed was
worth $100 per package and that agreement would survive even a deviation." De Vasconcel-
los v. The Sarnia, No. 60-374 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 1919) (Hough, J.) reprinted in Record, at
146-48, 258 U.S. 625. See also A. KNAUTH, OcsEA BiLLs OF LADING 243, 260 (4th ed. 1953).
The custom of calling a deviating ship an "insurer" has created serious confusion. In
Spartus Corp. v. The S/S Yafo, 590 F.2d 1310 (5th Cir. 1979), the court was persuaded by
the "holding" in Searoad Shipping Co. v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 361 F.2d 833 (5th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 973 (1966), that a nongeographical deviation ousts the
statutory $500 per package limitation. 590 F.2d at 1317. Although that was not the holding
in Searoad-the issue did not arise in that case-the Spartus court apparently was influ-
enced by the following dicta in Searoad: "Although one highly respected authority raises a
question whether under COGSA the awesome insurer consequence should now be visited on
the vessel for nongeographical deviations, and one Court of Appeals keeps a statutory, if not
a contract, limitation alive, we have no doubt that the insurer liability continues after
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vailing rule was that the deviating carrier lost the benefit of the
valuation clause.T Courts refusing to apply the valuation clauses in
deviation cases relied on the contract theory or the insurance the-
ory to justify their results. Some courts ruled that the deviation
ousted at least the provisions benefiting the carrier, including the
valuation clause, if not the entire contract. 8 Other courts reasoned
that a shipper might have agreed to the valuation clause only be-
cause it had assumed that its insurance would cover the true value
of the goods. Because the deviation ousted the shipper's insurance,
these courts reasoned that the carrier should be liable for the en-
tire damage6 9 As discussed earlier,7 0 these explanations are unsat-
isfactory. The contract theory does not explain why a deviation is
COGSA to flow from on-deck deviation where the damage is causally related." 361 F.2d at
835-36 (citing G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 3-40, at 156 (1957)) (foot-
notes omitted). The meaning of that discussion is ambiguous. The Searoad court assumed
that "insurer liability" meant liability where there is a causal relation between the deviation
and the loss. But Professors Gilmore and Black's primary objection to expanding the law of
deviation to nongeographical breaches was based on their belief that "insurer liability"
means liability even when there is no causal relation between the deviation and the loss. In
their second edition, Gilmore and Black describe the discussion of insurer liability in
Searoad as "puzzling." GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 7, § 3-42, at 182 n.124. The Searoad
court seems to have used the term "insurer liability" simply to mean strict liability-that is,
liability without regard to negligence or contractual defenses for damage caused by the
breach. The discussion in Searoad does not indicate either approval or disapproval of keep-
ing a statutory limitation alive. The issue in Searoad was whether the carrier was liable for
the on-deck carriage; the discussion quoted above declares only that the carrier is liable.
The $500 limitation per package provision was not raised by either of the parties or courts
in Searoad. This may be because the case involved 850 cases of dynamite, see 361 F.2d at
834 no.2, and the total damages were only $11,274.03. E.I. duPont de Nemours and Co. v.
The Sea Lane, No. 64-20-Adm-CF (S.D. Fla., filed Oct. 13, 1964); reprinted in Record at 45,
49, 361 F.2d 833, and in Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, 385 U.S. 973 at App. 3, 7. Appar-
ently the carrier in Searoad assumed that each case of dynamite was a "package" for pur-
poses of the $500 limitation.
67. St. Johns N.F. Shipping Corp. v. S.A. Companhia Geral, 263 U.S. 119, 124 n.1
(1923). The Supreme Court in St. Johns held that a deviation deprives the carrier of the
"relieving clauses," including the valuation clause, in the bill of lading. This followed Niles-
Bemerit-Pond Co. v. Dampkiesaktieselskabet Balto, 282 F. 235 (2d Cir. 1922), and The
Sarnia, 278 F. 459 (2d Cir. 1921), cert. denied, 258 U.S. 625 (1922). English courts reached
the same result. See, e.g., Cunard S.S. Co. v. Buerger, [1927] A.C. 1 (H.L. 1926); Balian &
Sons v. Joly, Victoria & Co., 6 T.L.R. 345 (C.A. 1890). See also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
§ 575 (1932).
68. E.g., The Sarnia, 278 F. 459 (2d Cir. 1921), cert. denied, 258 U.S. 625 (1922); Mc-
Kahan v. American Express Co., 209 Mass. 270, 95 N.E. 785 (1911) (railway); Davis Bros. v.
Blue Ridge Ry., 81 S.C. 466, 62 S.E. 856 (1908) (railway).
69. E.g., The St. Johns N.F., 280 F. 553 (2d Cir. 1922), aff'd sub nom. St. Johns N.F.
Shipping Corp. v. S.A. Companhia Geral, 263 U.S. 119 (1923).
70. See notes 27-34, 43-47 & accompanying text supra.
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such a fundamental breach that the carrier must lose the protec-
tion for which it contracted. The insurance theory is unpersuasive
because, under modern cargo insurance practice, shippers retain
their insurance even in the event of a deviation.
One could assert that valuation clauses should not apply to
deviations because they usually occur through a carrier's deliberate
breach of contract.7 1 However, by declaring a valuation of $100 per
package and accepting the benefit of the corresponding low freight,
the shipper agrees to accept the risk of any greater loss arising
from any cause, including deviation. Shippers might argue that
courts should not enforce this agreement because shippers cannot
bargain with carriers on an equal footing. But, the existence, if
any, of an unequal bargaining relationship is irrelevant to enforc-
ing the agreement, as the shipper is free to avoid the risk of loss
from deviation by declaring and paying for a higher valuation. 2
One reason for the courts' refusal to enforce valuation clauses
against deviations is that shippers can insure for the value in ex-
cess of $100 rather than pay the higher freight.73 Enforcing the
valuation clause would therefore enable carriers to limit their lia-
bility for deviation, thereby circumventing the policy against al-
lowing carriers to exempt themselves from liability through excep-
tion or deviation clauses. Under such reasoning, however, valuation
clauses should not be enforced to permit carriers to avoid liability
for their negligence. But the courts have enforced the valuation
71. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 575 (1932). Cf. Jones v. The Flying Clipper, 116
F. Supp. 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (ousting the $500 limitation imposed by the Carriage of Goods
by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1976)).
72. One could upset the $100 valuation if the higher freight were unfairly high, but
that is unlikely to happen. There is no reason for carriers to charge a higher freight than is
necessary to insure against the increased risk. See Diplock, Conventions and Morals
-Limitation Clauses in International Maritime Conventions, 1 J. OF MAR. L. & COM. 525,
529 (1970). Shippers argue further that the valuation clause is only intended to apply to the
voyage agreed upon, not to the new voyage resulting from a deviation. See McKahan v.
American Express Co., 209 Mass. 270, 95 N.E. 785 (1911) (railway). Cf. Jones v. The Flying
Clipper, 116 F. Supp. 386, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (when shipper elects not to declare higher
value than the $500 limitation applied by statute, it does not anticipate a deviation). But
the shipper whose cargo is damaged by negligence might argue as well that it only intended
the valuation clause to apply to situations in which the carrier was not negligent, but was
liable because the loss was not covered by an exception clause. It is simply impossible to
determine what the parties' intentions were, and the debate is meaningless in the long run
because carriers' and shippers' understanding of the effect of valuation clauses will be
largely determined by the courts' resolution of the issue.
73. See Diplock, Conventions and Morals-Limitation Clauses in International Mar-
itime Conventions, 1 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 525 (1970).
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clauses in negligence cases. 4
Valuation clauses also may not be given effect out of concern
that enforcement could lead to fraud by carriers. Deviation usually
takes the form of geographic diversion, overcarriage, delay, ship-
ment by another vessel or wrongful carriage on deck. A carrier
could plan on deviating at the time a bill of lading is signed and
thereby earn more than it is entitled to. Making the deviating car-
rier liable for the full value of cargo shipped would theoretically
deter such fraud by eliminating some of the profit from the fraud-
ulent scheme. Most deviations, however, arise innocently from
overbooking or underbooking, risks that are normally associated
with common carriage and that do not amount to fraud. It would
be fairer to impose punitive damages on defrauding carriers than
to deprive the innocent carrier of the valuation clause's protection.
The valuation clause gives the shipper a fair opportunity to
elect the extent of the risk it is willing to take. As long as the alter-
native freight rates offered the shipper are fair, no justification ex-
ists for not enforcing the contract as written in cases of deviation.
The Hague-Rules and The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA)
A more complicated issue arises76 under statutes that limit a
carrier's liability to a specified amount or authorize carriers to file
tariffs limiting their liability.77 In the United States, COGSA
74. See notes 64-65 & accompanying text supra.
75. Courts have been hostile towards enforcing the statutes which limit a shipowner's
liability to the value of the ship at the end of a voyage. See GxLMoRE & BLACK, supra note 7,
§ 10-4, at 822. But such hostility to limited liability is misplaced when the shipper foregoes
the opportunity to increase the shipowner's liability by paying a higher freight.
76. The issue seems to have arisen only in United States courts. See Report of the
Secretary-General, Second Report on Responsibility of Ocean Carriers for Cargo: Bills of
Lading [1973] 4 Y.B. COMM'R INT'L TR. L. 159, 183 11 29-31, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 9/76/ Add. 1;
Report of the United States Delegation to the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentia-
ries on the Carriage of Goods by Sea 61 at 41-2 (Feb. 5, 1979) (The Hamburg Rules pre-
serve "[tihe peculiar United States remedy of 'deviation"' for goods stowed on deck con-
trary to the shipper's instruction "despite almost universal disapproval on theoretical and
economic grounds of the concept that serious fault deprives the carrier of contractual excul-
pations and limitations.")
English writers have differed on the question. Compare R. CHORLEY & 0. GHMs, SHn-
PING LAW 187 (6th ed. 1970) (deviation does not oust limitation provision) with R.
COLINVAUX, 1 CARVER'S CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA § 299, at 258 (12th ed. 1971) (deviation
ousts limitation provision).
77. Although the discussion which follows in the text is restricted to deviations by
ships, similar considerations are applicable to land and air carriers. Tariffs filed by these
carriers generally limit liability to a certain amount, but are silent as to their applicability to
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provides:
Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or become
liable for any loss or damage to or in connection with the trans-
portation of goods in an amount exceeding $500 per package...
unless the nature and value of such goods have been declared by
the shipper before shipment and inserted in the bill of lading.78
On its face the provision applies "in any event," which would seem
to include deviation as well as any other breach of contract. 9 Sev-
eral courts have held that the statute limits a deviating carrier's
liability to $500 per package.80 Despite the unambiguous statutory
language, two leading courts have refused to apply the $500 provi-
sion to deviations. 1 Their position appears to be based in part on
an incomplete reading of COGSA's legislative history 8 2 COGSA
was enacted to implement a 1924 treaty, which was based on rules
deviation, and the legislation that authorizes the filing of tariffs furnishes no guidance for
resolving the issue. The courts have divided on the issue. Compare Seetapun v. Illinois-
California Express, Inc., 518 P.2d 885 (Okla. 1973) (deviation by truck ousts tariff limita-
tion); Philco Corp. v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 18 Mich. App. 206, 171 N.W.2d 16 (1969)
(deviation ousts airline tariff limitations); Ward v. Gulf M. & N. R., 23 Tenn. App. 533, 134
S.W.2d 917 (1939) (deviation by railroad ousts tariff limitation) with Rocky Ford Moving
Vans, Inc. v. United States, 501 F.2d 1369 (8th Cir. 1974) (deviation by truck does not oust
tariff limitation); Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951) (deviation by
airplane does not oust tariff limitation); Minneapolis Soc'y of Fine Arts v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 129 (D. Minn. 1963) (shipment by rail instead of air does not oust
airline tariff limitation).
78. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1976).
79. The statute contains a provision on deviation immediately prior to the limitation
of liability provision; this suggests that Congress had deviation in mind when it drafted the
limitation provision.
80. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Poseidon Schiffahrt (The Herman Schulte), 313 F.2d 872
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 819 (1963); Nassau Glass Co. v. Noel Roberts, Ltd., 249 F.
Supp. 116 (S.D. Fla. 1965); Varian Assoc. v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 85 Cal.
App. 3d 369, 149 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978). See also Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. SS Hong
Kong Producer, 422 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1969) (Hays, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 964
(1970).
81. Spartus Corp. v. The S/S Yafo, 590 F.2d 1310 (5th Cir. 1979); Encyclopaedia
Britannica, Inc. v. SS Hong Kong Producer, 422 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
964 (1970). But see Iligan Integrated Steel Mills v. SS John Weyerhaeuser, 507 F.2d 68 (2d
Cir. 1974) (does not extend deviation doctrine to oust the $500 limitation when carrier is
grossly negligent in furnishing an unseaworthy vessel).
82. The Fifth Circuit, in Spartus Corp. v. The S/S Yafo, 590 F.2d 1310 (5th Cir. 1979),
reviewed the legislative history but also rested its decision on the mistaken belief that an
earlier Fifth Circuit case, Searoad Shipping Co. v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 361 F.2d
833 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 973 (1966), had held that deviations oust the $500
provision. See note 66 supra. The Second Circuit based its holding on a district court opin-
ion, Jones v. The Flying Clipper, 116 F. Supp. 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), which discussed the
legislative history. See Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. SS Hong Kong Producer, 422 F.2d
7, 18 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 964 (1970).
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adopted at the Hague in September, 1921, by the Maritime Law
Committee of the International Law Association. The original
drafters -of the Hague Rules intended that shipowners would in-
clude the Rules voluntarily in their bills of lading,83 and several
shipowners did so.84 But as a term in a bill of lading, the limita-
tion-of-liability provision of the Hague Rules was entitled to no
more weight than any other valuation clause.85
Given this historical background, some courts have concluded
that COGSA's limitation provision should be given no more weight
than the provision had as a bill-of-lading term. 6 In short, if Con-
gress had intended the limitation provision to apply to deviations,
it would have said so "in clear and unmistakable terms.
'87
A more complete review of the histories of the treaty and stat-
ute suggests that courts ought to apply the $500 limitation to devi-
ations. The records of the conferences that produced the treaty
disclose that the drafters intended the limitation provision to cover
any claim for cargo loss or damage.88 A British delegate stated that
83. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 7, § 3-24, at 143.
84. Several major shipping lines did adopt the Hague Rules in their bills of lading
before the rules were codified in treaty form. 2 THIRTY-FIRST CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION 7-8 (1923).
85. When the Hague Rules were approved by the Maritime Law Committee of the
International Law Association in September, 1921, the federal courts had not yet decided
that deviations ousted valuation clauses. Indeed, two eminent American jurists had written
unpublished opinions to the contrary. Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Dampkiesaktieselskabet
Balto, (S.D.N.Y. April 9, 1921) (A. Hand, J.) reprinted in Record, at 158-67, 282 F. 535;
DeVasconcellos v. The Sarnia, No. 60-374 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 1919) (Hough, J.) reprinted in
Record, at 146-48, 258 U.S. 625. See note 66 supra. Further, the delegates that approved the
1921 rules knew that the United States courts enforced valuation clauses. 2 Report of the
Thirtieth Conference, 30 Aug.-3 Sept. 1921, International Law Association 161 (1922). Con-
sequently, if the drafters of the original Hague Rules had considered the question, they
probably would have thought that the limitation provisions would apply to deviations. But
prior to the first Brussels convention on the Hague Rules in October, 1922, the Second
Circuit reversed the opinions by Judge Hand and Judge Hough and ruled that deviations
oust valuation clauses. Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Dampkiesaktieselskabet Balto, 282 F. 235
(2d Cir. 1922); The Sarnia, 278 F. 459 (2d Cir. 1921), cert. denied, 258 U.S. 685 (1922). No
one at the 1921 conference seems to have noted Balian & Sons v. Joly, Victoria & Co., 6
T.L.R. 345 (C.A. 1890), an English case holding that deviations oust valuation clauses.
86. See Spartus Corp. v. The S/S Yafo, 590 F.2d 1310, 1315-16 (5th Cir. 1979); Jones
v. The Flying Clipper, 116 F. Supp. 386, 388-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). Cf. H. HART & A. SACKS,
THE LEGAL PROCESS 45 (tent. ed. 1958) ("[Olne of the major features of American legislation
[is] the extent to which the legislature acts as a ratifying agency giving effect to agreements
arrived outside the legislature.").
87. See Jones v. The Flying Clipper, 116 F. Supp. 386, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), quoted in
Spartus Corp. v. The S/S Yafo, 590 F.2d 1310, 1316 (5th Cir. 1979).
88. To clarify this point, the 1922 conference amended the 1921 rules. Proc~s-
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the provision would apply not only to losses caused by failure to
exercise proper care and custody of cargo but even to claims based
on unseaworthiness5 e Judge Hough, who presided at the discus-
sion, then indicated that unseaworthiness is a fundamental breach
that annuls the contract "just like unjustified deviation."90 Hence,
the drafters apparently intended that fundamental breaches such
as unseaworthiness and deviation would not oust the limitation
provision. 1
Also, COGSA's legislative history suggests that Congress in-
tended the $500 limitation on liability to apply to damage caused
by deviation. Congress added language to the limitation provision
at the urging of the United States Shipping Board to make clear
that carriers can limit their liability not only for physical damage
to goods but also for market loss caused by delay in reaching desti-
nation. 2 Further, Congress added the same language elsewhere in
the same subsection in order to exonerate carriers in certain cir-
cumstances for market loss resulting from delay caused by "unjus-
Verbaux, Confbrence Internationale de Droit Maritime 202 (1922) (copy on file at the Na-
tional Archives, Washington, D.C., Diplomatic Branch, File No. 585.7A3.) The 1921 Hague
Rules had provided: "Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible in any event for
loss or damage to or in connection with goods. . . ." 2 International Law Association, Thir-
tieth Conference (30 Aug.-3 Sept., 1921) at 262 (1922). The 1922 conference added the word
"any" before the words "loss or damage."
The 1922 conference changed article IV(4) and (5) in other respects not pertinent here.
The English version of the 1922 draft showing the changes made to the 1921 Hague Rules is
printed in 1923 A.M.C. 63, 63-75. The final text of the treaty differs in only minor respects
from the 1922 draft.
89. Procls-Verbaux, Conf6rence Internationale de Droit Maritime 191 (1922) (com-
ment of Mr. Langton, delegate from Great Britain).
90. Id. at 192 (comment of Judge Hough, delegate from the United States and chair-
man of the subcommittee). The French original reads, "L'innavigabilit6 est une cause fonda-
mentale annulant le contrat, tout comme la dbviation injustifi~e." Judge Hough believed
that deviations should not oust valuation clauses. Niles-Bement-Pond v. Dampkiesaktiesel-
skabet Balto, 282 F. 235, 238 (2d Cir. 1922) (Hough, J., concurring); DeVasconcellos v. The
Sarnia, No. 60-374 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 1919) (Hough, J.) reprinted in Record, at 146-48, 258
U.S. 625.
91. The British delegate, Mr. Langton, pointed out, however, that unseaworthiness
would deprive the carrier of the protection of the Act of God clause. Procas-Verbaux, Con-
f~rence Internationale de Droit Maritime 192 (1922) (comment of Mr. Langton).
92. Congress amended Article 4(5) of the Hague Rules to provide: "Neither the car-
rier nor the ship shall in any event be or become liable for any loss or damage to or in
connection with the transportation of goods in an amount exceeding $500 per package
. ." 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1976). (The language added by Congress is emphasized.) Relat-
ing to the Carriage of Goods by Sea: Hearings before the House Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. 81, 84 (1925).
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tifiable deviation."93 Congress therefore recognized that deviating
carriers can invoke the $500 limitation at least with respect to lia-
bility for market loss. Although other parts of the legislative his-
tory emphasize the seriousness of deviations, no one connected
with the drafting of COGSA appears to have maintained that a
deviation would oust the $500 limitation in case of physical dam-
age to cargo.94
It makes no more sense to oust the $500 limitation of COGSA
than it did to oust the $100 valuation clauses found in bills of lad-
ing. COGSA preserves the shipper's right to declare a higher value
and pay a higher freight. When the shipper elects not to do so, it
should not have the benefit of recovering the full value of goods
when they are lost or damaged. As the legislative history of
COGSA does not require the $500 limitation provision to be ousted
in case of deviation, the lead of those courts95 that have applied
COGSA's limitation provision in deviation cases should be fol-
lowed. Congress could aid in establishing this policy by amending
COGSA or by adopting one of two recent treaties.
93. Relating to the Carriage of Goods by Sea: Hearings before the House Committee
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1925). Section 4(5) of COGSA
provides in part: "Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible in any event for loss
or damage to or in connection with the transportation of the goods if the nature and value
thereof has been knowingly and fraudulently misstated by the shipper in the bill of lading."
(The language added by Congress to the Hague Rules is emphasized.) This change was also
made at the urging of the Shipping Board.
94. The legislative history of COGSA is almost totally silent on the issue of whether
deviation ousts the $500 limitation. Remarks that appear relevant do not squarely address
the issue. See, e.g., Relating to the Carriage of Goods by Sea: Hearings Before the House
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. 16 (1923) (statement
of Norman Beecher) (Deviation "imposes a rather heavy burden on the shipowner, who
must assume all the risk and serious results that flow from an unauthorized deviation in
every case."); Relating to the Carriage of Goods by Sea: Hearings Before the House Com-
mittee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. 192 (1925) (statement of
Charles S. Haight) (carrier that breaches promise to make direct delivery would be liable for
any damage or loss). See also 79 CONG. REc. 13341 (1935) (remarks of Sen. White) (The
$500 limitation provision generally increases the liability of carriers) (relied upon in Jones v.
The Flying Clipper, 116 F. Supp. 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1953)).
The United States Shipping Board held hearings on the Hague Rules in 1922 and 1928,
but there was no discussion of the effect of deviation on the limitation provision. The min-
utes of these hearings are available at the National Archives, Washington, D.C., Social and
Industrial Branch, File No. 640.2T34.




In 1968, several leading maritime nations signed a protocol to
the Hague Rules,96 which amended several provisions, including
the provision on limitation of liability. Sixteen nations, 7 including
the United Kingdom and France, have ratified the protocol, known
as the Visby Amendments. The United States has signed but not
ratified the protocol. Similar to the Hague Rules, the new protocol
limits a carrier's liability "in any event" to a specific amount, "un-
less the nature and value of the goods have been declared by the
shipper before shipment and inserted in the Bill of Lading."98
The Visby Amendments do introduce one important change to
the provisions limiting carrier liability. The carrier is deprived of
the limitation "if it is proved that the damage resulted from an act
or omission of the carrier done with intent to cause damage, or
recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably
result."' 9
The limitation provisions of the Visby Amendments allow de-
viating ships to limit their liability in virtually every instance.
Rarely will a shipper be able to prove that a deviation was inten-
tionally made to cause damage or with the knowledge that damage
would probably result.100 The Amendments mark a return to the
96. Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading Signed at Brussels on 25 August 1924, reprinted in
2 Register of Texts of Conventions and other Instruments Concerning International Trade
Law, at 180 (1973).
97. A list of the countries ratifying or acceding to the Visby Amendments as of May 2,
1980, is contained in MARITIME LAW ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES DOCUMENTS & MIN-
uTEs, Doc. No. 624 at 7208-09 (1980).
98. Article 2, which adds Article 4(5)(a) to the Hague Rules. Originally the Visby
Amendments limited liability to 10,000 Poincare Francs per package or unit, or 30 Poincare
Francs per kilo of gross weight of the goods lost or damaged, whichever is higher. In 1968,
10,000 Poincare Francs equalled about $662. The tremendous 'increase and the frequent
fluctuations in the price of gold since 1968 have made it desirable to establish a new means
of limiting liability. A recently signed protocol to the Visby Amendments establishes a limi-
tation of 667.67 Special Drawing Rights ("SDR's") of the International Monetary Fund
(about $863) per package or shipping unit, or 2 SDR's (about $2.59) per kilo. See MARITIME
LAw ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES DOCUMENTS & MINUTES, Doc. No. 624 at 7215, 7221
(1980). The value of the SDR fluctuates daily, but generally the fluctuations are not large.
99. Article 2, which adds article 4(5)(e) to the Hague Rules.
100. See W. TELEy, MARINE CARGO CLAIMS 360-61 (2d ed. 1978). Because the Visby
Amendments, like the Hague Rules, apply to "contracts of carriage of goods," one might
argue that a deviation ousts the contract and the Amendment. Cf. R. COLINVAUX, 1 CARVER'S
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good sense evidenced in some of the earlier valuation clause deci-
sions. A shipper that wants greater protection is free to pay more
freight. But if it agrees to a lower rate, the shipper accepts that it
will not fully recover if damage results from deviation.
Deviation Under the Hamburg Rules
In 1978, a long and arduous series of negotiations among sev-
enty-nine nations, including the United States, culminated in a
treaty on carriage of goods by sea.101 The treaty, known as the
Hamburg Rules, modifies the law of deviation in several respects.
Geographic Deviation
The Hamburg Rules do not specifically provide that carriers
are liable for loss caused by a geographical deviation. The treaty's
drafting history, 02 however, demonstrates that geographic devia-
CARRIAGE BY SEA § 299, at 258 (12th ed. 1971) ("ITIhe whole of the [Hague] Rules must be
regarded as part of the contract which is abrogated by the deviation."). However, Article 3
of the Visby Amendments provides: "The defenses and limits of liability provided for in this
Convention shall apply in any action against the carrier in respect of loss or damage to
goods covered by a contract of carriage whether the action be founded in contract or in
tort." If the shipper insists that Article 3 only applies to "goods covered by a contract of
carriage" and that a deviation ousts the contract, the proper response is that without a
contract the shipper has no cause of action against the carrier.
101. Of the twenty countries necessary for the treaty to become effective, only six have
thus far ratified or acceded to it. Conversation with Office of Treaty Affairs, United States
Dep't of State, Oct. 28, 1981.
102. The working group that considered the deviation problem in 1973 discussed the
approach of having no separate provision on deviation. It reported: "Under this approach
the carrier would be liable for the loss or damage resulting from deviation, if such deviation
cannot be justified by the carrier, on the basis of the general standard of carrier liability.
Thus, under the basic rule of liability adopted by the Working Group ...the carrier is
liable for all loss or damage to the goods unless the carrier proves that he, his servants and
agents took all measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the occurrence or its
consequences. This approach is also suggested in the Norwegian reply to the questionnaire."
Report of the Secretary-General, Second Report on Responsibility of Ocean Carriers for
Cargo: bills of lading, [1973] 4 Y.B. Comm. Int'l Tr. L. 159, 184 1 36, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 9/76/
Add. 1. The Norwegian reply stated: "[I]t may be questioned whether in liner trade, the
concept of deviation of the Convention Article 4(4) add [sic] much to what already follows
from the general rule as regards the duties of the carrier, including the duty of proper car-
riage, contained in its Article 3(2). In the submission of the Norwegian Government the test
of reasonable deviation and the test of proper carriage are for all practical purposes identi-
cal, both requiring that due regard be had to the cargo owner's interest in safe and expedi-
ent carriage of the goods to the destination, and both imposing liability on the carrier for
failure to do so. The implication is that the provision as regards deviation could-as the
more special one-be deleted as superfluous. On the other hand, in view of the importance
of the problem involved, the carrier's duty of proper carriage should perhaps be expressed in
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tion is a basis of liability under the treaty's general liability
provisions.103
Although geographic deviation continues to be a basis for im-
posing liability, the Hamburg Rules appear to change the carrier's
right to limit liability to a specified sum.104 Under the treaty, the
carrier cannot limit its liability "if it is proved that the loss, dam-
age or delay in delivery resulted from an act or omission of the
carrier done with the intent to cause such loss, damage or delay, or
recklessly and with knowledge that such loss, damage or delay
would probably result." 10 5 Under this provision, deviating ships
probably will not be able to limit liability for delay in delivery be-
cause most deviating carriers know that delay will result even if
that is not the sole reason for the deviation. Also, a deviation can
fairly be described as a reckless act because it creates a known and
almost certain risk of delay.
It is more difficult for the shipper to prove that a deviation
ousts the limitation for liability for physical damage to cargo. As is
the case under the Visby Amendments, a carrier rarely will know
that its deviation will result in cargo loss or damage. The Hamburg
Rules are therefore helpful in overcoming the policy of some courts
that deprives the deviating ship of the $500 limitation under
a more explicit and accentuated form in the new rules on the carriage of goods by sea." Id.
at 184 n.32.
103. Article 5 imposes liability on a carrier for "loss resulting from loss of or damage
to the goods, as well as from delay in delivery, if the occurrence which caused the loss,
damage or delay took place while the goods were in his charge ... unless the carrier proves
that he, his servants or agents took all measures that could reasonably be required to avoid
the occurrence and its consequences." Article 5(4)(a), reprinted in 1978 A.M.C. 1036, 1039.
If a shipper is suing for delay in delivery resulting from a deviation, the carrier will almost
certainly be liable under this provision. Deviation is an "occurrence" that caused delay, and
the carrier will be exempt only if it can show that it took all reasonable measures to avoid
deviating. A similar analysis will result in the carrier's liability for cargo lost or damaged
following a deviation.
104. Paragraph 1 of article 6 limits the liability of the carrier for cargo loss or damage
to an amount equal to the higher of 835 Special Drawing Rights of the International Mone-
tary Fund (which currently equals about $1,080) per package or 2.5 Special Drawing Rights
per kilogramme of gross weight. Liability for delay in delivery is limited to "two and a half
times the freight payable for the goods delayed, but not exceeding the total freight payable
under the contract. . . ." Article 6, paragraph 1, reprinted in 1978 A.M.C. 1036, 1040. Arti-
cle 6 further provides that the aggregate liability of the carrier for delay and damage or loss
shall not exceed the limitation "for total loss of the goods with respect to which such liabil-
ity was incurred." Id. These limitations "apply in any action against the carrier in respect of
loss or damage ... as well as of delay in delivery whether the action is founded in contract,
in tort or otherwise." Article 7, reprinted in 1978 A.M.C. 1035, 1041.
105. Id. article 8.
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COGSA. To be fair to the shipper, however, courts should inter-
pret the Hamburg Rules as giving the shipper an unqualified right
to declare a higher value and pay a correspondingly higher freight.
Similar language in COGSA has been interpreted to require the
carrier to give the shipper an option to pay a higher freight and
thereby receive greater protection.106 Such an option is essential
because it provides the shipper a fair opportunity to determine the
extent of the risk of deviation that it is willing to bear.
Deck Cargo
Generally, American courts hold carriers liable for cargo dam-
age resulting from stowage on deck if the bill of lading does not
indicate where the goods are to be stowed. 07 Also, according to the
weight of authority in the United States, in the absence of an ex-
press agreement or industry custom calling for stowage on deck,
courts will not enforce a bill-of-lading term that purports to give
the carrier the option to stow cargo on deck. 08 American courts
106. Article 6(4) of the Hamburg Rules provides, "By agreement between the carrier
and the shipper, limits of liability exceeding those provided for in paragraph 1 may be
fixed." Reprinted in 1978 A.M.C. 1035, 1040. Section 4(5) of COGSA provides that the lia-
bility shall not exceed $500 per package "unless the nature and value of such goods have
been declared by the shipper before shipment and inserted in the bill of lading." 46 U.S.C. §
1304(5) (1976). Courts have implied a requirement under COGSA that carriers afford ship-
pers a fair opportunity to declare a higher value. See, e.g., Pan American World Airways,
Inc. v. California Stevedore & Ballast Co., 559 F.2d 1173, 1176 (9th Cir. 1977).
107. E.g., Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. SS Hong Kong Producer, 422 F.2d 7 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 964 (1970); Searoad Shipping Co. v. E.I. duPont de
Nemours & Co., 361 F.2d 833 (5th Cir. 1966); The Rebecca, 20 F. Cas. 373 (D. Me. 1831)
(No. 11,619). No liability is incurred, however, if a container is stowed on the deck of a
container ship in breach of the bill of lading. DuPont de Nemours International S.A. v. The
Mormacvega, 493 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1974). See also Swindell-Dressler Int'l Co. v. M/V Hel-
lenic Ideal, 500 F. Supp. 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (stowage of large pieces of steel on deck con-
trary to the bill of lading is not a basis of liability because such stowage reduces the risk of
damage).
108. See St. Johns N.F. Shipping Corp. v. S.A. Companhia Geral, 263 U.S. 119 (1923);
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. SS Hong Kong Producer, 422 F.2d 7, 14 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 964 (1970); The Sarnia, 278 F. 459 (2d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 258
U.S. 625 (1922); 2A BENnDCT ON A ,muTY § 97 (7th ed. 1977); Sassoon & Cunningham,
Unjustifiable Deviation and the Hamburg Rules, in TIE HAMBURG RULES ON THE CARRAGE
OF Goons BY SEA 167, 183 (S. Manhabady ed. 1978). But see Givaudan Delawanna, Inc. v.
The Blijdendijk, 91 F. Supp. 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); The Peter Helms, 24 F. Supp. 461 (W.D.
Wash. 1938). Cf. Report of the United States Delegation to the United Nations Conference
of Plenipotentiaries on the Carriage of Goods by Sea 57 at 40 (Feb. 5, 1979) (no change in
law is made by Article 9(1) and 9(2) of the Hamburg Rules, which give effect to options in
bills of lading to stow cargo on deck). Givaudan Delawanna and The Peter Helms were
based in part on the mistaken belief that the "clean" bill of lading in St. Johns N.F. Ship-
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differ, however, over whether COGSA allows carriers that wrong-
fully stow cargo on deck to limit their liability.10 9
The Hamburg Rules modify the American rules regarding
deck cargo. Under the Hamburg Rules, wrongful stowage on deck
will still make the carrier liable for damage resulting from such
stowage. 110 But the Hamburg Rules authorize carriers to stow
goods on deck if the bill of lading contains an option to do so.""
Finally, the Hamburg Rules deny a carrier the right to limit liabil-
ity if it stows goods on deck without permission in the bill of lad-
ing and contrary to the shipper's request."'
ping Corp. v. S.A. Companhia Geral, 263 U.S. 119 (1923), contained no provision concerning
on-deck stowage. This mistaken belief was apparently created by the court of appeals' state-
ment in that case: "A clean bill of lading, dated June 12, 1918, was issued and contained no
reference to deck stowage or relieving clauses therefore. . . ." The St. Johns N.F., 280 F.
553, 554 (2d Cir. 1922). However, clause 20 of the bill of lading provided: "Also, Steamer has
the right to carry on deck." Record, at 19, 263 U.S. 119. The point was mentioned by the
carrier at the court of appeals and the Supreme Court. Brief for Appellant at 2, 280 F. 553
(2d Cir. 1922); Brief for Claimant-Petitioner at 3, 263 U.S. 119 (1923). The court of appeals
only meant by its statement that the bill of lading did not indicate that the goods were
actually stowed on deck. In an earlier opinion in the same case, Judge Hough addressed the
point more clearly, stating- "The bill of lading thus transferred is 'clean'; that is, it contains
no reference to the fact that the rosin was laden on deck .... Consequently it imports
under-deck shipment." The St. Johns N.F., 272 F. 673, 674 (2d Cir. 1921). See also The
Sarnia, 278 F. 459 (2d Cir. 1921) (The bill of lading contained a clause giving the carrier the
liberty to carry cargo on deck. Record, at 123, clause 15, 258 U.S. 625. The court said that
the bill of lading was "clean" and required stowage under deck.) Although one might expect
courts to respect a contractual provision giving the carrier the option to stow goods on deck,
bills of lading were customarily issued by the carrier only after the goods had been laden on
board. If goods were placed on deck, shippers expected the master to note this on the bill of
lading. In England, an option to stow on deck is apparently enforced. See Armour & Co. v.
Leopold Walford (London), Ltd. [1921] 3 K.B. 473.
109. Compare Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. SS Hong Kong Producer, 422 F.2d 7,
14 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 964 (1970) (wrongful stowage on deck ousts $500
limitation); Lime Int'l Corp. v. Alpha North American Line, Ltd., 1979 A.M.C. 2693
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (same) with Nassau Glass Co. v. Noel Roberts, Ltd., 249 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.
Fla. 1965). See also notes 80-81 & accompanying text supra.
110. Article 9(3), reprinted in 1978 A.M.C. 1042.
111. Article 9(1) provides in part: "The carrier is entitled to carry the goods on deck
only if such carriage is in accordance with an agreement with the shipper." Article 9(2), in
turn, provides in part: "If the carrier and the shipper have agreed that the goods shall or
may be carried on deck, the carrier must insert in the bill of lading ... a statement to that
effect." Reprinted in 1978 A.M.C. at 1041 (emphasis added).
112. Article 9(4), reprinted in 1978 A.M.C. 1042. The section denies the right to limi-
tation for goods stowed on deck if there was an "express agreement" to stow the goods
below deck. An "express agreement" need not be in writing. It refers to the request for
under deck shipment and the issuance of a bill of lading that does not give the option to
stow on deck. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Ninth session, Com-
mittee of the Whole (I), Summary Record of the 14th Meeting, 21 April 1976 at 4, 114, U.N.
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Although the Hamburg Rules governing deck cargo generally
give shippers fewer rights than they have under COGSA, the
Hamburg approach is fair, especially if carriers are willing to agree
to under-deck stowage at reasonable rates. If a shipper does not
request under-deck stowage, the carrier will most likely issue a bill
of lading giving it the option to stow on deck.13 A shipper who
desires under-deck stowage can request it and pay a higher freight,
thereby depriving the carrier of its right to limit liability if it
breaches. If a shipper does not bargain for under-deck stowage or
if the carrier is unwilling to guarantee such stowage,11 4 the shipper
assumes the risk that the goods will be placed on deck.
Conclusion
A modern court would be unlikely to repeat the observation
made in Davis v. Garrett1 5 that deviation "is undoubtedly a
ground of action."116 The theories often presented to support the
deviation rule are inadequate to support all of the rule's applica-
tions. The wrongdoer approach, imposing liability upon the deviat-
ing carrier because it has committed a wrongful act, is too emo-
tionally based to be accepted as a controlling principle. It does not
explain why deviating carriers should be liable for unforeseen
losses or why they cannot rely on contracts purporting to permit
deviation. The contract approach, which says that a deviating ship
cannot rely on the contract because of its breach, is formalistic and
does not explain why a deviation is such a fundamental breach
that the carrier loses the entire benefit of its contract. The insur-
Doc. A/CN.9/9/C.1/SR.14 (comments of Professor Sweeney, delegate from the United
States). To avoid evidentiary problems, shippers desiring stowage under deck should insist
on a bill of lading that states that the goods will be stowed in that fashion. See D. Sassoon
& J. Cunningham, Unjustifiable Deviation and the Hamburg Rules, in THE HAMBUaG
RuLEs ON THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA 167, 183 (S. Manhabady ed. 1978).
113. See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Ninth session,
Committee of the Whole (I), Summary Record of the 14th Meeting, 21 April 1976 at 4, 114,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/9/C.1/SR.14 (comments of Professor Sweeney, delegate from the United
States).
114. It may be impossible, for example, to obtain a below deck bill of lading for con-
tainers to be carried on a container vessel. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 7, § 3-42 at
183. Under current law, stowage of a container on the deck of a container ship in breach of a
bill of lading is not a basis for liability. DuPont de Nemours International S.A. v. The.
Mormaevega, 493 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1974).
115. 130 Eng. Rep. 1456 (C.P. 1830).
116. Id.
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ance theory, which would hold a deviating ship liable because it
ousted the shipper's insurance, does not explain why courts protect
shippers who can insure their cargo against a deviation even after
it occurs.
The best reason for continuing to hold deviating ships liable is
to deter them from creating unauthorized risks. Any injustice to
the breaching carrier resulting from the punitive aspects of this
rule is minimized by the enforcement of valuation clauses or statu-
tory provisions limiting the carrier's liability to a specified amount.
Of the five issues presented at the beginning of this Article,
three can be easily resolved. First, the concept of deviation should
be applied to carriers other than ships. "There is nothing pecu-
liarly nautical" about deviation. 117 "[A] deviation is no more than a
breach of the contract of carriage." 1 8 To the extent that the law of
deviation is properly applied to ships, it should be applied to rail-
roads, airlines, and other carriers. Second, deviation should also be
applied to non-geographic breaches. Any breach of contract that
increases the risk beyond that agreed to by the shipper is an ap-
propriate basis for liability. Third, carriers should be liable for
deviation when the shipper is insured. A shipper need not lose its
insurance in order to sue for deviation. The unauthorized creation
of risk is an independent basis for liability.
The fourth issue raised in this Article is more difficult to re-
solve. Most would agree that it is unfair to hold a deviating carrier
liable for losses that would have occurred even if the carrier had
not deviated. Neither the shipper nor the carrier, however, is likely
to be able to prove whether the same loss would have happened
had the ship not deviated. The location of the burden of proof,
therefore, effectively determines whether deviation will be a basis
for liability. This Article suggests that courts take a different ap-
proach to liability for losses that might have occurred even if the
carrier had not deviated. Deviations are harmful because they in-
crease the risk of loss, so deviating carriers reasonably should be
liable only when the deviation increases the risk of the type of in-
jury that actually occurred. For example, a geographic deviation
117. Tate & Lyle Ltd. v. Hain S.S. Co., 151 L.T.R. 249, 253 (C.A. 1934) (Scrutton,
L.J.), rev'd on other grounds, 1936 2 All E.R. 597 (H.L.); Farr v. Hain S.S. Co., 121 F.2d
940, 944 (2d Cir. 1941) (L. Hand, J.). Cf. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 556
(1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (strict liability of maritime carrier is not based "on any
peculiarly maritime aspects of the carriage").
118. Farr v. Hain S.S. Co., 121 F.2d 940, 944 (2d Cir. 1941).
I-
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ought to render a ship liable for cargo injured during the prolonged
voyage following the deviation, but not for cargo damaged during
unloading. Similarly, wrongfully stowing cargo on deck ought to
render the ship liable for losses caused by cargo being washed
overboard, but not for cargo lost when the entire ship is lost at sea.
Finally, this Article maintains that contractual and statutory
limits on liability should apply to suits for deviation. No justifica-
tion exists for ignoring the plain meaning of a contractual provi-
sion or statutory term that limits a carrier's liability to a specific
amount. The refusal of some courts to apply these limitation
clauses has given rise to most of the controversy and confusion
concerning the law of deviation. For example, shippers have sought
to extend the use of the deviation remedy believing that a devia-
tion will or may oust the relevant limitation. Philco illustrates the
abuse that results from ousting limitation provisions on account of
a deviation. The court in Philco concluded that the carrier's tariff,
limiting liability to 500 per pound, applied even if the carrier were
reckless.119 The court held, however, that the limitation would be
ousted if there were a deviation, for a contrary ruling "would per-
mit any carrier to violate with recklessness the terms of the bill of
lading, knowing it cannot be called upon to pay more than 50 cents
per pound. 1 20 Recklessness is either covered by the tariff or it is
not, but the term "deviation" ought not to be used as an incanta-
tion to achieve results that the court otherwise would not reach.
The Second Circuit has led the way in using the deviation doc-
trine to oust COGSA's $500 limitation provision. A few years ago
the court recognized, however, that its use of the doctrine seemed
inconsistent with the statute and ought not to be extended. 21 Nev-
ertheless, it defended its practice of ousting the $500 provision
when goods are wrongfully stowed on deck: "[w]hatever may be
thought of that principle, it is easy to administer and carriers know
the risks. 1 2 2 Although predictability and administrative feasibility
are desirable, they are not sufficient reasons for the continued im-
119. The court discussed the issue largely in terms of gross negligence. But as the
court noted, the shipper's allegation of gross negligence was premised on the allegation that
the carrier's actions were "willful, wanton, and reckless." Philco Corp. v. Flying Tiger Line,
Inc., 18 Mich. App. 206, 171 N.W.2d 16, 19 (1969).
120. 18 Mich. App. 206, 224, 171 N.W.2d 16, 25 (1969) (emphasis added).
121. Iligan Integrated Steel Mills v. SS John Weyerhaeuser, 507 F.2d 68, 72 (2d Cir.
1974).
122. Id.
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position of an unduly harsh rule. One suspects that the motivation
for the use of deviation to oust the $500 limitation is the undying
spirit of the wrongdoer principle coupled with a hostility to limita-
tions on liability. Civilized society, however, has learned to curb
the wrongdoer principle and judicial hostility to limitations on lia-
bility are out of place when the injured party-the shipper-has
freely chosen not to have greater protection.

